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My introduction to the Norwegian oral health care system as a field for research was 
quite accidental. As a Master’s student in Public Health at the University of Tromsø, I 
was invited to participate in an ongoing project in the Public Dental Service (PDS) in the 
county of Troms. Inspired by New Public Management ideas, the PDS project aimed at 
studying alternative methods of management and provider payment in public oral health 
care. I wrote my master’s thesis about the use and effects of performance related pay in 
the PDS in Troms county as a part of this project (Abelsen, 2003).  
 
The work with my master’s thesis made me aware of the striking differences that exist in 
Norway concerning the organisation and financing of oral health care compared to 
general health care. The public responsibility for general health care includes the whole 
population, and the scope is universal coverage involving public finance, and historically 
public provision as well. Concerning oral health care, there seems to be less emphasis on 
providing the same level of service to all citizens. The limited public responsibility for 
providing oral health care leaves Norwegian dentistry dominated by private providers, 
and most adults faced with paying all costs themselves when they seek dental services. 
These aspects have potential distributional consequences, which are only explored to 
some extent in the research literature. For me these aspects make the Norwegian oral 
health care system an interesting field for research.  
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The Norwegian discourse concerning health and health care does not evolve much around 
aspects of oral health and oral health care. During the last decades different parts of the 
general health care systems have experienced some extensive reforms (Lian, 2003). 
Among these are the list patient reform (fastlegereformen) and the hospital reform 
(sykehusreformen). The reforms have implied rather extensive changes concerning the 
organisation of general health care in Norway. Nevertheless, a common denominator of 
these reforms is that they have not involved any changes concerning the organisation or 
financing of oral health care. However, in 2004 a government committee was appointed 
for the purpose of evaluating public involvement in oral health care. During the time I 
was working on this thesis, the committee finished its work, and their suggestions were 
debated and concluded upon as part of a national political process. Aspects of this process 
are addressed as part of this thesis, although no reform similar to the ones seen in other 
health care areas originated from this process. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
On a general level, the research problems focused in this thesis concern different issues 
on provision and access to dental services in Norway. The provision of dental services 
concerns the supply side of dentistry, and one of the research problems addressed is how 
providers should be paid for their services. Do dentists prefer performance-related pay or 
a fixed salary? Which form of payment further societal oral health policy objectives?  
 
To some extent, different health professions are educated to perform the same tasks. 
Based on the rationale of cost efficiency, it is a stated oral health policy objective in 
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Norway to delegate more dental work from dentists to dental hygienists. This makes the 
issue of task division between dentists and dental hygienists highly relevant. Another 
central research problem addressed in this thesis is therefore to what extent Norwegian 
dentists and dental hygienists consider it desirable to delegate more tasks from dentists to 
dental hygienists.  
 
Norwegian health policy is in general founded on the idea or objective of ensuring that 
people receive equal access to health care for equal needs. Access can be improved by 
making access independent of income and/or geography. In this thesis a central issue 
concerns adult access to dental services, and I particularly question whether there is equal 
geographical access to dental services among adults in Norway.  
 
The final research problem addressed concerns how we can explain why, in a country like 
Norway with its strong emphasis on equal access to health care, there is such a limited 
public responsibility for provision and access to oral health care. 
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The second chapter of this thesis outlines theoretical and empirical aspects concerning i) 
the financing, ii) government, iii) need for, and iv) the regulations of oral health care, 
reflecting the different aspects of the four papers included in the thesis. The third chapter 
treats methodological issues that are relevant for the empirical analyses of the thesis. In 
particular, different aspects concerning survey responses are considered. A summary of 
the included papers, its main findings and contributions is presented in the fourth chapter. 
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The fifth chapter includes some final reflections. The present thesis is then organised as a 
collection of four separate papers with its special themes, research questions, and 
methods. One of the papers is co-authored with my supervisor, whereas I have authored 
the others alone. The papers are as follows: 
 
I. Abelsen B. Pay scheme preferences and health policy objectives (re-
submitted to the Journal of Health Economics, Policy and Law). 
II. Abelsen B. and Olsen JA. Task division between dentist and dental 
hygienists in Norway, Community Dentistry and Oral Epidemiology. 2008, 
36, 558-566. 
III. Abelsen B. What a difference a place makes: Dental attendance and self-
rated oral health among adults in three counties in Norway. Health & Place, 
2008, 14, 827-838. 
IV. Abelsen B. On the absence of regulations of adult dental services in 




2 SCENE SETTING  
The Norwegian oral health care system refers to the production, financing and 
consumption of dental services. Three important actors are involved: patients (or 
households), dental service providers, and public authorities. The relations between these 
actors include dental service demand, supply, payments, and different aspects of 
governance, regulations and support (see illustration in Figure 1). The providers supply 
the patients with dental services. The patients (or households) finance this supply of 
dental services by direct payments to the providers and by paying tax to the public 
authorities. Concerning the financial part of the system, a fundamental identity links total 
expenditures on services, total revenues raised to pay for those services, and total 
incomes earned from the provision of services. This means that expenditure by one agent 
will always end up as a similar sized income to one or more other agents (Evans, 1997).  
 
Seen as a political system, the Norwegian oral health care system is governed by public 
authorities through laws and other forms of regulation, which affect the type, amount, 
location, price and quality of dental service production. To be stable, the system depends 
on political support from the public and the providers — the latter can be seen as 
exchanged with professional autonomy. The internal organisation and inter-professional 
relationship between different provider groups is also an important part of the Norwegian 


































Figure 1: Model of the Norwegian oral health care system. 
 
My scientific approach when dealing with the chosen issues concerning provision and 
access to dental services as they relate to the Norwegian oral health care system draws 
from multi disciplinary perspectives and theoretical frameworks. My basic perspective, 
however, is health economics, although I also focus on perspectives from sociology, 
political science, and critical theory. 
 
The following parts of this chapter outline different aspects of the Norwegian oral health 
care system, and they point to where the papers of this thesis contribute new knowledge. 
Chapter 2.1 outlines the financing of dental services, particularly focusing on the parties 
paying for dental services and how providers are paid. Chapter 2.2 explains aspects of the 
government of oral health care provision, focusing in particular on the inter-professional 
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relationship between dentists and dental hygienists. Chapter 2.3 sets the focus on people’s 
need for oral health care and issues of equal access. Chapter 2.4 addresses aspects 
concerning the regulation of oral health care provision. 
 
2.1 FINANCING ORAL HEALTH CARE 
When it comes to financing health care, the money can flow directly from the patent to 
the provider of health care or indirectly from the patient to the provider via a third-party 
payer. Finding a suitable financing arrangement depends on the need for insurance and 
redistribution.  
 
In general, people’s future health status is uncertain as well as their future need for health 
care and associated health care expenditures. The institutional response to uncertainty is 
developments of insurance mechanisms (Arrow, 1963; Evans, 1984; Dolan and Olsen, 
2002), where individuals make regular payments to a risk-pooling agency in return for 
some form of guarantee of some form of reimbursement if illness occurs. The risk-
pooling agency might be a public body or a private firm, payments might be taxes or 
premiums, and benefits might be fixed cash payments, reimbursement of all or parts of 
actual expenditures, or direct provision of care when services are needed. 
 
Choices with respect to health care financing have significant distributional consequences 
(Evans, 1997). If a health care system is tax-financed, more contributions will be made by 
wealthier individuals, and less if the system is user-paid. Private insurance premiums are 
based on expected use of care, resulting in actuarially fair insurance premiums, which 
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tend to take a bigger share from people with a lower income. As such, out of pocket 
payments and private insurance premiums are regressive means of raising revenue, while 
tax-financed systems typically emerge as proportional or mildly progressive. A 
progressive health care finance system will result in there being less inequality in income 
after payments for health care have been made, and, in this sense, the payments will have 
a pro-poor redistributive effect (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000). In addition, tax-
financed systems are more cost effective than private insurance systems when it comes to 
administrative costs (Dolan and Olsen, 2002). 
 
The general health care system in Norway is tax-financed, publicly governed and based 
on principles of universal coverage. Oral health care for adults, however, is not a part of 
this system.  
 
2.1.1 WHO PAYS FOR DENTAL SERVICES? 
As Figure 1 illustrates, it is the patients (or households) who pay all expenditures for 
dental services. This is done either indirectly through tax payments or directly through 
out-of-pocket payments at dental service delivery. In 2005, direct patient payments 
constituted 75 percent of the total payments in Norwegian dentistry (St.meld. nr.35, 
2007). Private insurance for dental expenses is practically non-existent in Norway 




The Norwegian oral health care system is characterised by a distinct split between public 
and private sector dentistry. The Public Dental Service (PDS) is a tax financed county 
responsibility and the counties shall, according to the Act Relating to Dental Health 
Services (www.lovdata.no), offer and provide dental services on a regular basis, in order 
of priority, to: 
a) children and adolescence under 19 years of age 
b) the mentally handicapped 
c) people (elderly/disabled) who are under care in institutions or at home for longer 
than 3 months due to long term illness 
d) young people under 21 years of age 
e) other groups (mostly people in prison) as prescribed in an approved plan  
 
Dental services for the prioritised groups specified above are provided free of charge, 
except for group d who have to pay 25 percent of their dental service expenses out of 
pocket. Some of the fees for orthodontic care for people 18 years and younger is also paid 
out of pocket.  
 
In general, adults have to pay all their dental expenses out of pocket. However, there are 
some limited public reimbursements for specific medical conditions. Adults are served by 
private dental clinics. Private clinics can be established anywhere in the country and 
providers are free to set the prices for dental services. However, a small part of the adult 
population mainly in rural areas, buys dental services in public clinics because private 
dental service is not available. Norway is claimed to be the only one among the advanced 
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welfare states not somehow providing basic dental services for adults via public policy 
(Holst, 1982; Erichsen, 1990). 
 
2.1.2 HOW ARE PROVIDERS PAID? 
There is reason to believe that a third-party payer will prefer a payment system for health 
care which further health policy objectives. Whether such a system coincides with the 
provider’s payment preferences is another, yet interesting, question. Different payment 
systems involve incentives for different behaviours. Providers on a fixed salary are paid 
the same no matter how much their individual production increases. Performance-related 
pay offers an incentive for increasing the performance that is paid for, whether this 
performance has any health effect or not. In other words, the absence or presence of 
financial incentives linked to measures of performance may generate unanticipated or 
dysfunctional behaviour (Prendergast, 1999).  
 
Information in the form of skilled care is what is actually being bought from 
professionals in general (Arrow, 1963), and from dentists in particular. An asymmetric 
information relationship exists when one party possesses more information than the other, 
and where this information is of a kind considered important to the latter (Dolan and 
Olsen, 2002). In the dentist/patient relationship the patients are most often insufficiently 
informed about the impact of dental services to their oral health status to fully protect 
their own interests. The information gap between patient and provider calls for some 
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form of control over provider entry to and conduct in health care markets and is 
according to Evans (1984), almost universally accepted. 
 
The relationship between the dentist and the patient can be seen as a principal/agent 
relationship (McGuire, 2000), where the dentist is the agent acting on behalf of the 
principal (patient). If this agency relationship is perfect, the agent will act as if she was 
the patient. Evans (1984) claimed that this Hippocratic ideal case is unlikely to appear 
because the agent has economic interests of her own and is, therefore, likely to alter the 
patient's preferences and induce demand. Supplier-induced demand (SID) refers to the 
extent to which the provider influences a patient's demand for services to differ from 
what the patient would have demanded if she had the same information as the provider 
(Dolan and Olsen, 2002). SID is difficult to prove empirically, and its existence has been 
one of the most controversial topics in health economics (McGuire, 2000). If present, SID 
is a display of monopoly power which might be used in order to maximise the dentist’s 
utility rather than the patient’s. However, it is assumed that the professional self-
regulative code of ethics will act as a powerful constraint on the profit-maximising 
behaviour of dentists and other health professions (Dolan and Olsen, 2002). 
 
In the period from 1976-1995 prices for dental services in Norway were fixed and 
negotiated annually. Based on data from 1989, Grytten (1991) claimed to find evidence 
of SID among Norwegian dentists, and concluded that in areas of excess supply dentists 
were able to maintain their workload by increasing demand without having to move to 
areas of higher demand. Since 1995, free pricing for dental services has been practiced in 
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Norway. After that, Grytten and Sørensen (2000) have claimed to find some evidence 
against the inducement hypothesis. Still, there is reason to believe that the free pricing 
arrangement is favourable for the private dentists as official statistics for the period from 
1995-2007 shows that the consumer price index for dental services has increased by 103 
percent, compared to a 31 percent increase in the overall consumer price index (StatBank, 
Statistics Norway).  
 
The scientific knowledge base on provider payment arrangement and payment 
preferences in Norwegian dentistry is meagre. Paper I aims at giving a contribution 
concerning these issues. Given the range of potential payment arrangements that exist, 
the paper inquires into which arrangement Norwegian dentists would prefer for 
themselves, and which they think would be best for achieving oral health policy 
objectives. 
 
2.2 GOVERNING ORAL HEALTH CARE PROVISION 
The Act Relating to Dental Health Services states that each of Norway’s 19 county 
authorities shall ensure that sufficient health services are available to all persons resident 
in the county, and the county authority is given the responsibility for planning and 
coordinating public and private dental service. The county authority appoints a county 
dental officer responsible for the overall administration of dental activities in the county. 
Each county is further divided into dental health service districts with a district dental 
officer responsible for implementing public oral health activities. These activities are as a 
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rule performed by personnel employed in public dental clinics. In general, public clinics 
are small concerning the number of employees.  
 
The private sector is also characterised by small clinics (e.g. quite a few solo practices) 
with a majority of self-employed dentists and sole proprietor businesses (Grytten, Skau, 
and Holst, 2007). Private sector dentistry is given the right to establish clinics wherever 
they want. The fragmented structure of private sector dentistry limits the county 
authorities’ ability to actually plan and coordinate dental services for the whole 
population within their county.  
 
Under local political governance some differences in the dental service availability is 
expected from one county to another. However, the variation seen among Norwegian 
counties e.g. when it comes to population to dentist ratios (see Table 1), is not only a 
result of differences in county plans and coordination — market mechanisms have to be 
taken into account as well. With free establishment rights and free pricing the PDS can be 
seen as lacking important measures to actually govern the provision of dentistry in the 
county.  
 
Large differences in population to dentist ratios can be observed between the densely 
populated capital city/county of Oslo and thinly populated counties such as Finnmark, 
Nord-Trøndelag and Hedmark (see Table 1). Paper III presents a structural 
categorisation of the counties based on population density (PD) and dentist density (DD) 
in 2006. This structural categorisation put six counties in the high PD/high DD category 
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(Akershus, Oslo, Buskerud, Vestfold, Vest-Agder, Rogaland, Hordaland, and Møre og 
Romsdal), five counties in the low PD/high DD category (Østfold, Telemark, Sogn og 
Fjordane, Nordland, and Troms), and six counties in the low PD/low DD category 
(Hedmark, Oppland, Aust-Agder, Sør Trøndelag, Nord Trøndelag, and Finnmark).  
 
























Whole country  4 077  72  759 47 14.6 1 177 6 320  5.4
Østfold  212  76  27 60 63.5 1 270 9 874  7.8
Akershus  410  79  78 39 105.4 1 287 6 808  5.3
Oslo  624  89  92 64 1 234.5 923 6 248  6.8
Hedmark  136  68  29 35 6.9 1 398 6 577  4.7
Oppland  140  64  13 49 7.3 1 318 14 176  10.8
Buskerud  207  75  36 46 16.8 1 232 7 034  5.7
Vestfold  194  77  36 43 101.8 1 180 6 418  5.4
Telemark  145  68  18 40 10.9 1 160 9 466  8.2
Aust‐Agder  83  69  15 39 11.6 1 295 7 157  5.5
Vest‐Agder  138  71  20 54 22.8 1 223 8 627  7.1
Rogaland  347  70  59 53 44.0 1 211 7 116  5.9
Hordaland  454  73  95 56 29.9 1 035 4 965  4.8
Sogn og Fjordane  93  61  22 36 5.7 1 145 4 861  4.2
Møre og Romsdal  219  70  29 38 16.3 1 136 8 606  7.6
Sør Trøndelag  208  63  33 34 15.0 1 381 8 742  6.3
Nord‐Trøndelag  76  71  15 39 5.8 1 727 8 543  4.9
Nordland  201  59  53 43 6.1 1 169 4 458  3.8
Troms  136  49  61 43 6.0 1 142  2 554  2.2





Some counties with a relatively higher population to dentist ratio seem to compensate for 
the maldistribution of dentists by adding relatively more dental hygienists in the public 
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dental workforce (see Table 1). However, this does not appear to be a consequent policy 
measure. 
 
A public responsibility for providing dental care was first implemented in Norway in  
1917, when a new law ordered all city municipalities to provide free dental services to 
their school children (Hedum, 2007). Outside city municipalities, offering dental services 
to school children was optional, hence such services were hardly ever provided. This 
difference between the city municipalities and other municipalities introduced a 
rural/urban divide in oral health care, which in many ways has remained an issue up until 
today.  
 
In 1949, a new law was imposed aimed at establishing a population-based public oral 
health care system in all counties (folketannrøkta). Those aged 6-18 years old should be 
given free dental services in public clinics. Others should also be given dental services in 
public clinics but they had to pay all costs themselves. A full implementation of the 
population-based system never succeeded because of a shortage of dentists. The system 
was rejected in 1983 with the enforcement of the still present Act Relating to Dental 
Health Services which made the counties responsible for governing oral health care 
(Hedum, 2007), with responsibilities as described above. 
 
While the private sector of dentistry continues to grow, recruiting dentists to public dental 
service has been a challenge for decades (Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2003). 
Different alternative measures have been implemented to improve recruitment and 
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retention of dentist to the public sector, where the establishment of dentist education at 
the University of Tromsø in 2004, extensive recruitment of dentists from abroad, and 
public policy aiming at substituting dental hygienists with dentists are among the major 
ones. The measures also include different local county initiatives such as increased pay, 
extra vacation, and scholarships, although they have not proven to be very successful 
(Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2003).  
 
Grytten (1991) concluded that the maldistribution of dentists is not likely to be altered by 
allowing market mechanisms to operate on the dental care market. However, Norwegian 
health authorities have been reluctant to regulate the provision of oral health care in the 
same manner as has been the case with general health care provision. The lack of public 
financial arrangements subsidising adult dental services is likely one major explanatory 
factor for this situation.  
  
2.2.1 DENTAL SERVICE PROVIDERS 
The Norwegian dental work force includes four professions: dentists, dental hygienists, 
dental technicians, and dental secretaries. Their titles are protected and they all require 
authorisation to practice. Authorisation is given by state authorities mainly based on 
educational requirements. It entails independent and personal responsibility and calls for 
high professional and ethical standards to ensure patient safety (www.safh.no). Dentists 
provide a wide spectre of dental services ranging from examination to treatment of a 
variety of oral diseases and disorders. Dental hygienists play a vital role in providing 
preventive dental services, but they also provide basic dental services overlapping the 
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ones provided by dentists. Dental secretaries and dental technicians can be seen as filling 
dental auxiliary roles. Because the tasks division between dentists and dental hygienists 
seems less settled than between any other pair of dental professions, it is the relationship 
between dentists and dental hygienists which is investigated in this thesis. 
 
Definitions of what a profession is vary within the literature and change over time and 
context. Friedson (1994) states that a profession refers only to the few occupations that 
are widely recognised as possessing very high prestige and a genuine monopoly over a 
widely demanded task, such as the old and traditional professions of medicine and law. 
Abbott (1988), however, defines professions as exclusive occupational groups applying 
abstract knowledge. He sees professions as existing in a system, and the evolution of 
professions as a result of their interrelations. The professions, the tasks they perform, and 
the links between them change continuously. Social forces such as politics and 
technology influence changes. Professions compete for jurisdiction and an exclusive 
scope of practice. Abbot claims that the struggle over jurisdiction is the key to 
understanding professions and their development over time. Erichsen (2003) points to 
jurisdictional struggles between the medical profession and dentists when she outlines the 
foundation of the public policy concerning oral health care in Norway, especially when 
she aims at explaining why oral health care at an early stage was left out of the universal 
general health care system.  
 
Today, following Abbott (1988), the dental professions of Norwegian dentistry can be 
seen as organised around the knowledge system they apply, and hence status within and 
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between these professions reflects their degree of involvement with this knowledge 
system. As such, the status is much higher among dentists than among dental secretaries, 
and dentists in academic positions might enjoy a higher status than front-line dentists 
with direct client contact. Internal status differences create wide disparities in income, 
power, and prestige.  
 
The relationship between the state and health professions is also often of the challenging 
kind. The relationship between the state and a health profession is typically examined 
either from a pressure group perspective or from an institutionalist, or state-centred, 
perspective (Erichsen, 1995). The pressure group perspective views professions as 
powerful groups outside the state, striving for autonomy and a minimum of regulations of 
professional activities, as health policies are largely interpreted as state intervention in the 
market. The institutionalist perspective views professions as powerful groups inside the 
state, as professionals are found incorporated in public bureaucracies and are expected to 
use their professional authority to influence health polices by providing information and 
expert analyses. 
 
The inter-professional relationship between dentists and dental hygienists include 
potential conflict because they are educated to some extent to perform the same tasks. 
Studies have shown that the quality of dental services is maintained when shifted from 
dentists to dental hygienists (Wang and Holst, 1992; Wang and Riordan, 1995; Öhrn, 
Crossner, Borgersson, and Taube, 1996), as well as improved efficiency (Nordengen, 
Fylkesnes, and Søgaard, 1990; Wang and Holst, 1992; Hannerz and Weterberg, 1996; 
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Widström, Linna, and Niskanen, 2004). The Health Personnel Act (www.lovdata.no) 
enforced in Norway in 2001, relaxed the subordination of dental hygienists to dentists 
from Norwegian legislation. Dental hygienists are now allowed to practice independently 
from dentists in accordance with their professional qualifications. People’s oral health has 
improved over time, and many individuals only require regular dental services at a level 
which can be provided by dental hygienists. This opens the possibility to change the 
dental hygienists position in the Norwegian oral health care system from labour 
supplement to labour substitute, a change which seems highly welcomed by Norwegian 
health authorities (Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2003; NOU, 2005; St.meld. 
nr.35, 2007). The rationale behind these policy statements rests mainly on the idea that 
there is scope for efficiency gains in oral health care provision through some substitution 
of dentists with dental hygienists. However, the required changes challenge the inter-
professional relationship between dentists and dental hygienists.  
 
Paper II aims at investigating the attitudes among dentists and dental hygienists to 
Norway’s policy objective of delegating more dental work from dentists to dental 
hygienists. To what extent are the proposed changes welcomed or rejected among dentists 
and dental hygienists in the public and private sectors in Norway?  
 
2.3 NEED FOR ORAL HEALTH CARE 
Following Grossmann (1972), it can be assumed that people inherit an initial stock of oral 
health that depreciates with age and can be improved by investments. Purchasing dental 
services can be seen as a derived demand for oral health improvement. It is oral health 
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per se, and not oral health care, as a commodity, which is of value to people. An 
increased focus on preventive oral health care can be explained in this context. However, 
purchasing cosmetic dental services is not motivated by the investment benefits in terms 
of improved oral health, but rather the consumption benefits of having nice teeth.  
 
In analysing demand, economists distinguish between wants (a desire to consume 
something), effective demand (a want backed up by ability and willingness to pay), and 
needs (the capacity to benefit from care). Not all wants or effective demand are needs and 
vice versa. Wants and effective demand is, to some extent, linked to judgements made by 
sovereign consumers, whilst a need can be seen as a condition objectively stated by 
skilled health professions. If an unregulated market decides the distribution of care, a 
simple micro-economic model suggests that a downward sloping demand curve will meet 
with an upward sloping supply curve and establish an equilibrium price where the 
number of services demanded equals the number of services supplied. Such a market 
meets the effective demand, but does not necessarily coincide with peoples needs 
(Morris, Devlin, and Parkin, 2007). In other words, the free market will fail to distribute 
dental services in accordance with people’s needs. 
 
Gaps between the needs for care and service delivery can be addressed by policies aimed 
at reducing the needs for care or at improving access to care (Leake and Birch, 2008). 
Reducing needs calls for improvements in oral health status which can be achieved 
through behavioural changes addressed through preventive care (e.g. dietary changes, 
reduced tobacco use, and improved oral hygiene). Access to care can be improved by 
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removing price barriers, and making care available so individuals are able to find 
providers capable and willing to deliver dental services.  
 
Government interference in health care markets sets priority to meet with people’s needs, 
in line with an egalitarian theory of justice. The egalitarian distributive principle of 
“equal access for equal need” is suggested to reflect the preferences of most individuals 
(van Doorslaer, Wagstaff, and Rutten, 1993; Dolan and Olsen, 2002). The egalitarian 
viewpoint suggests that publicly-financed systems should predominate, with care being 
distributed according to need and financed according to an ability to pay. A libertarian 
viewpoint focuses towards privately-financed systems, with care being rationed 
according to an individual’s ability and willingness to pay. Government involvement is 
minimal and limited to providing a minimum standard of care for the poor (Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer, 2000). Throughout Europe oral health care is financed and delivered by a 
mixture of systems (Andersen, Treasure, and Whitehouse, 1998; Widström and Eaton, 
2004; Kravitz and Treasure, 2008), and there are traces of both ideologies in policy 
making. 
 
2.3.1 PREDICTABLE NEEDS AND COSTS FOR MOST PEOPLE 
The demand for health insurance is characterised by an unpredictable and potentially 
large monetary loss if illness occurs. Although dental diseases have high prevalence 
compared to most other diseases, the associated treatment costs are fairly predictable 
(Grytten, 1992). People’s dental expenses tend to be foreseeable and controllable, more in 
the nature of maintenance costs than unexpected events. High costs are usually the result 
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of accumulated need. Dentistry has therefore traditionally been described as 
“uninsurable”, reflecting its association with regular, small, predictable, and controllable 
“losses”, and the absence of people at risk of ruin if illness occur in the same manner as 
when it comes to general health (Evans, 1984).  
 
The lack of an insurance motive may explain why public and private insurance 
institutions for adults are absent in the Norwegian oral health care system. Still this does 
not explain why insurance institutions for dental services exist in other countries, e.g. 30 
percent of adult Danes have private health insurance which include reimbursement for 
dental service costs (Kravitz and Treasure, 2008). The existence of such arrangements 
likely has historical and institutional explanations which are left unaddressed in this 
thesis. However, the “uninsurable” nature of dentistry does not mean that some people 
might not need subsidy to cope with their dental service expenses. In addition, bad oral 
health is found to worsen systemic conditions such as diabetes and respiratory and 
cardiovascular diseases (Wamala, Merlo, and Boström, 2006). A core group of 
modifiable risk factors related to lifestyle and standard of hygiene is common to many 
chronic diseases and injuries, and most oral diseases (Petersen, 2009). Therefore a 
movement from the isolated “uninsurable” perspective on dentistry to a perspective 




2.3.2 EQUAL ACCESS 
In health economics, the distribution of health and health care is often normatively judged 
by the criteria of equity (Morris, Devlin, and Parkin, 2007). The concept of equity is 
defined in different ways (Mooney, 1983; Whitehead, 1992; Braveman and Gruskin, 
2003), but essentially it means fairness in the distribution of health and health care. 
Aiming at equity means to reduce or eliminate differences which result from factors that 
are considered to be both avoidable and unfair. Two main forms of health equity are 
identified: horizontal equity which means equal access to care for equal needs, and 
vertical equity, which means treating those who have different needs differently. The 
published literature focuses to a large extent on horizontal equity, and the most prevalent 
theories explaining inequity outcomes concern the role of socioeconomic status 
(Machinko and Starfield, 2002).  
 
In the Norwegian system where adults pay all dental service costs out of pocket, unequal 
income will result in unequal access to dental services. In a recent OECD-study, 6.5 
percent of the adult population in Norway reported unmet needs for dental examination, 
compared to 4.3 percent across OECD countries. All countries reported higher levels of 
unmet needs among lower socio-economic status (SES) groups, but the differences 
between higher an lower SES groups in Norway were among the highest in the study (de 
Looper and Lafortune, 2009).  
 
Important variations in access to health care are also associated with geography, and the 
pursuit of territorial equity is often a central health policy objective (Rice and Smith, 
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2001). Unequal geographical access to dental services means that the total costs for 
dental services will differ between people in different geographical areas due to 
variations in time and travel costs to receive dental services. However, securing equal 
access between rural and urban areas can be quite a challenge, and people in rural areas 
may have to live with lower levels of service than their urban counterparts due to the 
trade-off that exists between equity and efficiency in the allocation of health services. 
Equal access to health care is anyhow a central objective of the Norwegian health policy 
(Proposition to the Storting No. 1 (2006-2007)). 
 
The demand for dental services among Norwegian adults has been examined fairly 
regularly in national surveys since 1973 (Holst, Grytten, and Skau, 2004). To some 
extent, these surveys can be used to indicate something about adult access to dental 
services. They are, however, designed to make inferences concerning the whole 
population, and as such, are not designed to form the basis for comparative studies of the 
situation in different geographical areas within the country. Therefore, the scientific 
knowledge about geographical variation in access to dental services among adults in 
Norway is meager, which is also the case when it comes to knowledge concerning any 
geographical variation in oral health. Paper III addresses questions of geographical 
variation in dental attendance and self-rated oral health among adults in three different 





While there are rather extensive regulations in Norway concerning where providers of 
general health care are allowed to practise and what they can charge for their services, 
oral health care is not regulated in the same manner. Private dental clinics can be 
established anywhere in the country, and the charges for private dental services are 
decided by the individual provider. This leaves the counties who are given the overall 
responsibility for providing dental services to all county citizens, with few measures to 
improve people’s access to dental services if needed. 
 
The oral health care system differs from country to country, but most other European 
countries experience more government interference and regulations of this system than in 
Norway (Kravitz and Treasure, 2008). Regulation can be defined as the exercise of 
authority typically imposed by national governments over individuals or organizations, in 
order to produce socially desirable results (Saltman, 2002). Governments can pass laws 
and regulations that require businesses and individuals to behave in certain ways. The 
asymmetric relationship between patients and health care providers is one reason for 
regulating the provision of health care, and it’s justified because the uncontrolled 
marketplace fails to produce results or behaviour in accordance with public interests 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999).  
 
The Norwegian welfare state share many common aspects with the welfare states in 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Typical features of the ‘Nordic model’ are universal 
public services such as education and health, provided free of charge and available to the 
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whole population (Kautto, Fritzell, Hvinden, Kvist, and Uusitalio, 2001). Concerning the 
oral health care systems there are similarities, but also distinct differences. In all four 
countries, the PDS provides free dental care for children and adolescents. However, 
Widström et al. (2005) claim that public interference in the oral health care system is 
greater in Sweden and Finland, than in Norway and Denmark. Table 2 sums up some 
characteristics concerning the oral health care system in the four countries. The 
population to dentist ratio is fairly similar in these countries and among the lowest 
compared to other countries in Europe (Kravitz and Treasure, 2008). However, the 
private sector of dentistry is smaller in Sweden and Finland than in Norway and 
Denmark. The population to dental hygienists ratio varies among the four countries and 
the ratio seen in Sweden and Finland is much lower than in Norway and Denmark.  
 
When it comes to financial aspects and oral health status Norway and Denmark are 
actually quite different. Free pricing in private dental practice is present in all countries, 
except in Denmark where the fees are defined in departmental order (Kravitz and 
Treasure, 2008). All adults are covered by tax-financed public health insurance schemes, 
which mean that they are entitled to some public subsidy of dental service costs, except in 
Norway where only certain limited groups of adults are provided free dental care (see 
chapter 2.1.1).  
 
The oral health status indicators concerning 12-year-olds presented in the table indicate 
differences between the four countries; the situation seems to be better in Denmark, 
compared to Norway. The DMFT index describes the prevalence of dental caries in 
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individuals by summing the number of decayed (D), missing (M), and filled (F) teeth (T). 
Fluoride is a substance which protects teeth against tooth decay. In Denmark, fluoride is 
found naturally in some water supplies — a fact which might contribute to explaining 
why the oral health status appear to be better among Danish 12-year-olds than among 
Norwegian (Kravitz and Treasure, 2008). 
Table 2: Characteristics of the oral health care system in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark 
  Norway Sweden Finland  Denmark
Population to dentist ratio  1 201 1 239 1 178  1 141
% of dentists in general practice  68 44 51  70
Dentist to dental hygienist ratio  5.3 2.3 2.6  6.0
Public dental service organising body counties counties municipalities  municipalities
Free pricing in general practice  yes yes yes  no
General public subsidies for adults   no yes yes  yes
Average DMFT at age 12  1.4 1.0 1.2  0.7
% with DMFT zero at age 12  47 58 42  72
Source: (Kravitz and Treasure, 2008) 
 
Even if the rationale behind most health care system reforms is claimed to be a perceived 
need to reduce the growth in health care expenses (Christensen et al., 1995), more public 
funds have recently been invested in oral health care in Sweden and Finland (Widström et 
al., 2005). Both countries have increased public resources to subsidise dental service for 
adults with the aim of improving access and the quality of services. Widström et al. 
(2005) find it interesting that there has not been heavy public pressure towards public 
subsidy for adult dental service costs in such a rich country like Norway.  
 
When a government committee was appointed in 2004 to evaluate the public involvement 
in oral health care, the previous serious political debate concerning the question of public 
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funding for adult dental services in Norway dated back to 1914 (Holst, 2004). However, 
the committee did not end up suggesting any general arrangement concerning increased 
public funding for adult dental services. To improve people’s access to dental services, 
they suggested establishment control of dental clinics and price regulation of dental 




3 THE RESEARCH PROCESS,  
METHODS AND MATERIAL 
My basic and pragmatic starting point when it comes to doing research, is that the nature 
of the research question or theme decides which research method is appropriate. 
Consequently, I am open to both quantitative and qualitative research approaches, as well 
as mixed methods (Bryman, 2007), and I consider myself a supporter of methodological 
polytheism, a practice attributed to Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). The 
research process conducted for this thesis can be seen as multiparadigm. A research 
paradigm constitutes assumptions, practices and agreements among a scholarly 
community, and a multiparadigm research approach refers to the conduct of parallel or 
sequential studies using multiple paradigms (their respective methods and foci) to collect 
and analyse data and develop varied representations of a complex phenomenon (Lewis 
and Grimes, 1999). However, a multiparadigm approach may challenge intellectual 
hegemonies and the incommensurability of different research paradigms can be 
provocative to some scholars (Willmott, 1993). 
 
Quantitative research seeks facts and accurate predictions from numerical values, and 
often looks for (causal) relationships between variables. Quantitative research addresses 
what, who and how questions. It claims to be value free and objective, even if the 
research process often involves many subjective judgements (Ercikan and Roth, 2006). 
The researcher is a separate observing third party who is identifying and explaining, 
distanced from the phenomenon itself. Reliability and validity of the measuring 




Qualitative research aims to illuminate people’s interpretation of facts focusing on reason 
and understanding. Qualitative research often addresses why questions, and can be 
characterised as the attempt to obtain an in-depth understanding of the meanings and 
definitions of a situation (Wainwright, 1997). It is often conducted in settings where 
context is taken into account. The impact of the researcher is far more obvious and more 
readily acknowledged in qualitative than in quantitative research. Subjectivity is often a 
stated determinant of the research process, and is frequently addressed by the researcher 
in a (self-) reflexive way (Breuer, Mruck, and Roth, 2002). 
 
I see the work with this thesis as an educational process which opens the opportunity to 
explore different methodological angles and to increase my competence with different 
methods and methodological perspectives. Personally, I cannot see any reason why one 
should not be able and aim to understand and use statistical methods to analyse 
quantitative data as well as qualitative techniques to analyse written or spoken language. 
When I for the purpose of this research project have chosen to use different research 
approaches, it is the result of a personal, time consuming and reflective process. Limiting 
my research to a solely quantitative approach would be a conventional and safe option, 
especially considering my thorough formal training in statistics (I have a master degree in 
statistics). However, I feel that my decision to also include a paper based on qualitative 
research adds significantly to the understanding of the Norwegian oral health care system, 





The purpose of the following sections of this chapter is to present some relevant 
methodological aspects which are not fully covered by the papers. First, aspects of the 
two surveys which serve as the basis for papers I-III, are focused upon. Then the critical 
discourse analysis which is used in paper IV is presented and discussed. Finally, I reflect 
on my role as a researcher in the field of oral health care. 
 
3.1 SURVEY RESPONSE 
Probability sampling is the basis for unbiased inference from relatively small observed 
samples to larger unobserved populations. The assumption underlying this inferential 
process is that elements designated for the sample are actually observed or measured. 
Hence, when a postal questionnaire is used as a method to observe a sample, it is crucial 
that people respond.  
 
Despite the fact that mail surveys are widely used as a data producing method, there is 
actually very little known about why some people respond, whereas others do not 
(Albaum, Evangelista, and Medina, 1998). Exchange theory represents one common and 
plausible theory of mail survey response behaviour (Dillman, 1978). Exchange relations 
are by definition reciprocal, and accordingly, people will participate in mail surveys when 
the benefits outweigh the costs, whether economic or social. Cognitive dissonance theory 
represents another possibility for explaining mail survey behaviour (Furse and Steward, 
1984). According to this theory, failure to respond to a mail survey will create a state of 
disharmony within people, which will only be reduced by answering the survey. The 
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theory of commitment or involvement represents yet another plausible theory (Albaum, 
Evangelista, and Medina, 1998; Loosveldt and Storms, 2008). People are more likely to 
respond to mail surveys if the topic, sponsor or researcher is relevant to them; the more 
relevant, the more committed they are to respond. 
 
Increased reluctance to participate in surveys is a general trend internationally (de Leeuw 
and de Heer, 2002; Curtin, Presser, and Singer, 2005). Even if the common prescription 
for survey researchers is to minimize non-response rates, non-response can, but need not, 
induce non-response bias in survey estimates (Groves, 2006). There is no minimum 
response rate below which survey estimates are necessarily biased, and no maximum 
response rate above which they are never biased (Singer, 2006). Different methods can be 
used for assessing non-response bias. The most common tool is comparing the survey 
estimates with population estimates, e.g. concerning socioeconomic or demographic 
variables such as age and gender. There are also different post-survey methods used to 
adjust detected biases, among which weighting adjustment is common (Groves, 2006).  
 
Various types of incentives are used as measures to increase response rates (Artzhammer 
and Klein, 1999; Larson and Chow, 2001; Edwards et al., 2003; Singer, 2006). The use of 
monetary and non-monetary incentives has a long history as methods of improving 
response rates (Shettle and Mooney, 1999; Singer, van Hoewyk, Gebler, Raughunathan, 
and McGonagle, 1999; Ryu, Couper, and Marans, 2005; Teisl, Roe, and Vayda, 2005) 
Follow-up contact, pre-notification and university sponsorship are other measures also 
proven to increase response rates (Edwards et al., 2003). The use of incentives is founded 
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on Gouldner’s (1960) norm of reciprocity claiming the existence of a social normative 
standard, leading individuals to strive to repay favours freely given. In accordance with 
exchange theory the use of incentives will increase the benefits of participation, whereas 
it according to dissonance theory can be seen as a measure to manipulate dissonance. In 
general, it seems that incentives work: monetary incentives — especially cash — are 
more effective than non-monetary incentives, and prepaid incentives are more effective 
than conditional ones (Singer, van Hoewyk, and Maher, 2000; Edwards et al., 2003). 
There is also evidence suggesting increasing response rates with increasing value of 
prepaid monetary incentives (Jobber, Saunders, and Mitchel, 2004). 
 
In the surveys conducted for this thesis, both weighing (to adjust for bias) and incentives 
(to increase response rate) are used. 
 
3.2 SURVEY 1 
The first survey which provided data for paper I and II was conducted in April 2005, 
among a sample of Norwegian dentists and dental hygienists. Questionnaires were mailed 
to 1,111 dentists and 268 dental hygienists. The sampling frames were the Norwegian 
Dental Association (NDA) and the Norwegian Dental Hygienist Association (NDHA), 
where 96 percent and 86 percent of all practicing dentists and dental hygienists 
respectively, are members. For reasons not relevant to this context, the questionnaires 
were mailed to all dentists and dental hygienists in two counties in Norway (161 dentists 
and 69 dental hygienists), in addition to a random sample of dentists and dental hygienists 
from the rest of the country (950 dentists and 199 dental hygienists). One follow-up 
33 
 
mailing was done including an offer to respond electronically on the Internet. In total, 
504 dentists and 112 dental hygienists responded, which gave a rather low, but not 
unusual, survey response rate of 45 percent and 42 percent, respectively.  
 
The extent (four A4 pages) of the questionnaire and its structure with several different 
topics are likely to have contributed to the low response rate. The non-responders might 
have considered the costs of participation higher than the benefits, and our ambition to 
include different themes in the same data production process might have given the 
questionnaire an unfocused and irrelevant image, counterproductive to response.    
 
Table 3: The geographical and sector distribution among NDA and NDHA members, and the 













East1  38,8 38,8 31,7  31,8
South2  18,9 18,6 18,4  18,4
West3  22,3 22,7 20,2  20,2
Mid4  10,5 11,5 12,4  12,3
North5  8,5 8,4 17,3  17,3
Total  100,0 100,0 100,0  100,0
   
Sector   
Public  33 31 67  64
Private  67 65 30  35
Public and private  ‐ 4 3  1
Total  100 100 100  100









Because the sampling method introduced a geographical bias, the data material was 
weighed in order to secure a representative geographical balance in the samples analysed. 
As the distribution of public and private dentists and dental hygienists in the weighted 
sample also coincided fairly well with the corresponding populations the weighed sample 
was considered representative of the dentist and dental hygienist population in Norway 
(see Table 3). For further relevant details, see Papers I and II. 
 
3.3 SURVEY 2 
The second survey produced the data used in Paper III, and was conducted in 
October/November of 2006. The low response rate from the first survey had taught us 
some lessons, so this time, the questionnaire was shorter (two A4 pages) and focused on 
one main issue: dental service utilisation. In order to boost the response rate, we 
experimented with an incentive. The questionnaire designed for this study was mailed to 
a random population sample of 800 adults aged 21-60 years old in each of three different 
counties in Norway (Akershus, Troms and Finnmark), giving a total sample of 2,400. In 
each county a systematically selected half of the sample (every second person on the list) 
received a scratch lottery ticket together with the questionnaire (incentive group), while 
the other half received only the questionnaire (no-incentive group), i.e. 1,200 in each of 
the two groups. This particular scratch lottery (Flax) is a continuously run national lottery 
with which most Norwegians are familiar. First prize in the scratch lottery is 1 million 
NOK. Six weeks after the first invitation, a reminder — a questionnaire without 




Table 4 shows higher response rates in all three counties in the group that received the 
scratch lottery ticket compared to those who did not. The incentive had a significant 
positive effect on the total response rate, with an odds-ratio of 1.257 (p-value< 0.008, 
95% CI = [1.063 – 1.487]). The scratch lottery ticket incentive also increased the share of 
less educated people, a group which is traditionally difficult to target in surveys. The 
incentive experiment is presented and analysed in a separate paper (Olsen, Abelsen, and 
Abel Olsen, 2009). However, the response rate in the no-incentive group was actually 
quite high compared to the response rates experienced in survey 1 described above. This 
is probably due to a short, focused questionnaire with a topic found relevant among the 
majority of people asked to participate. The nature of the questions to the public was 
relatively simple as well, compared to the ones the professionals were asked which were 
cognitively more demanding and perhaps also controversial. For further relevant details, 
see Paper III.  
 
Table 4: Response rates in the incentive and no-incentive groups between counties and total 
  Incentive  No‐incentive  Total   n
Akershus  63% 58% 60%  782
Troms  65% 60% 63%  772
Finnmark  65% 58% 61%  752
Total  64% 59% 61%  2 306





3.4 LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The data produced from surveys 1 and 2 are reported and analysed in Papers I-III. A 
variety of statistical analyses is included, but all three papers incorporate one version or 
another of logistic regression analysis. In practice, situations involving categorical 
outcomes are quite common. Logistic regression analysis extends the techniques of 
multiple linear regression analysis to research situations in which the outcome variable is 
categorical. In binary logistic regression analysis the dependent variable (Y) is a 
categorical dichotomy, e.g. only two values are possible (Y=0 or Y=1). The predictor 
variables or independent variables can be continuous or categorical, as in a multiple 
regression analysis. 
 
Despite the similarities between linear and logistic regression, the non-linearity of a 
dichotomous dependent variable makes it inappropriate to apply linear regression to 
analyse this type of data (Field, 2005). One way around the non-linearity problem is to 
transform the data to linearity by using a logarithmic transformation. Logistic regression 
analysis is based on such logarithmic transformation. As such, it is the probability of Y=1 
that is modelled in a logistic regression analysis. 
 
As in linear regression, the logistic regression model estimates individual association 
between predictors or independent variables and the dependent variable. In linear 
regression analysis, this contribution is indicated by the estimated regression coefficients 
(bi), which estimates the change of the dependent variable following one unit change in 
the predictor i. In a logistic regression model the estimated regression coefficient exp(bi) 
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(or odds ratios), estimates the change in the odds of Y=1, as the predictor i changes one 
unit, e.g. if exp(b) = 1.5, this means that the probability of Y=1 increases relatively by 50 
percent as the predictor changes one unit, and if exp(b) = -0.5, this means that the 
probability of Y=1 decreases relatively by 50 percent as the predictor changes one unit. 
 
In Paper II, only binary logistic regression analyses are included. In Paper I, the binary 
logistic regression analyses are part of a multilevel approach, as the analyses take into 
account both an individual and a structural level. In Paper III, a multinomial logistic 
regression analysis is performed. Multinomial logistic regression analysis extends the 
binary analysis to situations where the dependent variable has more than two values. In 
the analysis performed in Paper III, the dependent variable has three values. In the 
analysis one of these values serves as the reference category for the other two. 
 
3.5 CRITICAL DISCOURCE ANALYSIS 
Parallel to my work with this thesis, a rare public health policy debate went on in 
Norway. It was rare because it evolved around the public involvement in oral health care, 
an issue which has not often appeared on the political agenda during the last century. 
Following the developments of this political debate was very interesting, and Paper IV is 
based on this debate. Public health policy is developed more or less through debate 
between state and societal actors. Public argument is the process through which the 
underlying interests of differently empowered groups contest against each other for 





The Green Paper (NOU, 2005) from the committee appointed in 2004 to evaluate the 
public involvement in oral health care can be seen as part of the contest described above 
as well as a reality-producing process. This is also true of the hearing documents, the 
White Paper (St.meld. nr.35, 2007) from the government, and other texts produced as part 
of this political process. However, when reading these texts it struck me how different 
“reality” is perceived from different positions. For a long time, I had the desire to use this 
particular process and the texts involved in it as the basis for scientific research, but I 
could not figure out how - until I discovered discourse analysis.  
  
A discourse can be seen as a public conversation, and it includes representations of how 
things are and have been, as well as imaginaries — representations of how things might, 
could, or should be (Fairclough, 2005). Discourse analysis literally refers to the analysis 
of texts or language, and is increasingly used to analyze health-related discourses (Smith, 
2007; Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2008). Foucault who is one of the “founding fathers” of 
discourse analysis referred not only to linguistic practice or statements, but also to the 
material and other practices that bring about a certain type of statement (Foucault, 1972). 
However, as discourse analysis is not a coherent research paradigm of well-defined 
procedures, but a theoretical approach which covers a broad range of methodological 
devices, there are many variants of discourse analysis (O'Reilly, Dixon-Woods, Angell, 




Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a particular type of discourse analysis research 
where power or, more specifically, social power, is a central notion (van Dijk, 2001). 
Groups have social power if they are able to control the opinions or acts of other groups, 
which presupposes a power base of privileged access to scarce social resources like 
money, knowledge, status, authority, or public debate. As such, CDA aims at exposing 
social power inequalities. In CDA texts are not viewed as powerful in themselves, but are 
given power within the context where they are produced and used (Wodac, 2001). I use 
CDA to analyse text produced as part of the recent Norwegian policy debate on public 
involvement in oral health care, and as my point of departure, I positioned the dentist 
profession in possession of social power. 
 
The purpose of the CDA is not to test hypothesis or look for associations which might 
explain why events occur, nor to explore the experiences of research participants. Its 
function is, in this context, to reflect back on how oral health policy is constructed, 
legitimised, and maintained. Much CDA has been criticised for being a disappointment 
because it yields findings that can always be predicted in advance, once the basic power 
relations have been sketched out (Buckholtz, 2001). This may be so, but its most valuable 
contribution may sometimes lie in actually sketching out the power relations and point up 
situations where power is not necessarily legitimate. The position of the researcher in 
presenting only one of a number of possible interpretations is another problematic aspect 
of CDA. Alternative interpretations are not presented and the researcher risks being seen 
as a part of the dominant ideology that she is hoping to challenge (Ballinger and Payne, 
2000). The subjectivity inherent in a CDA might be “reduced” to inter-subjectivity if a 
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team of researchers conducted the analysis, as a CDA team would most likely emphasize 
shared cognition and consensus in their analysis. However, a CDA will never be 
objective. To capture more subjective and inter-subjective dimensions of research Finlay 
(1998) argues in favor of the researcher being reflexive, on both a methodological and a 
personal level. 
 
3.6 ON THE OUTSIDE LOOKING IN 
The research conducted for this thesis is related to a field of practice (dentistry) where I 
am clearly an outsider. As I am not a professional in the field of dentistry and am only 
slightly familiar with its knowledge base, I most certainly observe and perceive issues of 
dentistry and oral health care differently from insiders (dental professions). Unless I am a 
professional, I do not rationalise as a professional. As such, I study the field of practice 
from a distance. This can be seen as both a disadvantage and an advantage. 
 
I was more aware of, and troubled by, the disadvantage in the beginning of the research 
process as I struggled to determine which tasks and procedures dentistry actually 
involved, and which professions performed these tasks. I needed knowledge to be able to 
write something meaningful about the task division between dentists and dental 
hygienists. I figured that it would be much easier to write about this issue if I was trained 
in the field of dentistry, and I feared that my writings would reveal my ignorance. I have, 
however, become reconciled with the notion that when it comes to dentistry, there are 
multiple realties and my perspectives on issues of provision and access to dental services 
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are of value merely because they are likely to differ from the views held by many 
insiders. 
 
To compensate for my lack of professional knowledge a close collaboration was 
established with some highly qualified dentists, who held relevant experience from 
research as well as Public Dental Service leadership and administration. This 
collaboration was operative in the first part of my work with this thesis and was 
particularly valuable in the process where the questionnaires for the two surveys were 
designed. 
  
Not being a professional probably makes me unaware of certain aspects concerning the 
field of practice which professionals take for granted. This, I reckon, is mostly an 
advantage. The astonishment which to some extent characterise my perceptions on 
provision and access to dental services in Norway is perhaps not an issue with a 
professional. However, questioning the presence of political perplexity when it comes to 
provision and access to oral health care can and should indeed be completed by non-
professionals. 
 
I recognise that my location as a citizen and researcher in a small town in the 
northernmost part of the country where the chronic lack of dentists in my home county is 
a reoccurring topic addressed in the local media, has been of importance for this research 
process. As I was reading research results concerning the Norwegian population, stating 
that approximately 80 percent of the adult population receive dental service on a regular 
42 
 
basis, I questioned these figures because they did not match up with my own experiences 
of the attendance among adults living in my part of the country. The survey reported in 
Paper III, which studies differences in dental attendance between different counties in 




4 SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
OF THE PAPERS 
4.1 PAPER I 
PAY SCHEME PREFERENCES AND HEALTH POLICY OBJECTIVES 
Paper I is based on survey data from Norwegian dentists who have provided information 
about their current and preferred pay schemes, and indicated which pay scheme, in their 
opinion, would best further overall oral health policy objectives of efficiency, stability, 
and quality.  
 
The results indicate a general preference among dentists for pay schemes including 
performance-related pay (PRP). These results have to be seen in relation to the fact that 
dentists provide easy measurable output which is also easily attributable to one dentist. 
As such, PRP seem suitable as part of provider payments for dental services. Public 
dentists would like to be exposed to more PRP, while private dentists are happy with their 
current high PRP exposure. However, solo practising private dentists were currently 
exposed to more PRP than they preferred.  
 
Different payment systems give incentives for different behaviour. Therefore the choice 
of payment systems for health care is to a large extent also a choice of health policy. 
Public dentists preferred pay schemes believed to further stability objectives, while 
private dentists preferred pay schemes believed to further efficiency objectives. Both 
public and private dentists believed that pay schemes furthering efficiency objectives 
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have to include more PRP than pay schemes believed to further stability and quality 
objectives. 
 
The paper introduces the idea of split preferences; as a consumer the dentists maintain 
self-serving interests which are different from the interests and preferences they maintain 
as citizens. Their selfish preferences are not necessarily what they consider to best serve 
societal interests. Classical economics argue the notion that competitive markets driven 
by self-serving interests and Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” tend to advance broader 
social interests. Economists, therefore, traditionally emphasize individual preferences and 
self-serving interests when they analyse questions concerning work payments. The 
findings from this paper suggest that Norwegian dentists, to some extent, recognise 
collective interests as different from individual ones. Further research might disclose to 
what extent dentists view collective interests as important to pursue through payment 
incentives. 
 
4.2 PAPER II 
TASK DIVISION BETWEEN DENTIST AND DENTAL HYGIENISTS 
IN NORWAY 
The aim of the study was to investigate the attitudes among dentists and dental hygienists 
concerning Norway’s policy objective of delegating more dental work from dentists to 
dental hygienists. The survey sought to explore any discrepancies between the current 
and preferred mix of different work tasks, as well as attitudes about to the idea of 




The results showed that dentists spent only half of their total working hours on complex 
dental services, i.e. tasks that only dentists are skilled to undertake. Nearly 40 percent of 
their time was spent on tasks that dental hygienists are qualified to perform. Still, the mix 
of work tasks that dentists preferred would involve only slight changes. Seemingly 
contrary, the majority among the dentists responded that it was desirable to delegate more 
tasks to dental hygienists. However, only 21 percent of the dentists agreed that dental 
hygienists should be the entry point for dental services. Dental hygienists would prefer to 
perform relatively more basic treatments and fewer examinations and screening, and the 
vast majority among them supported the idea that they could be the entry point for dental 
services. 
 
The results suggest that there will not be major changes in the division of labour between 
dentists and dental hygienists in Norway, if dentists are to be held responsible for taking 
such initiatives. Although dentists agree that more of their current work could — in 
principle — be delegated to dental hygienists, they do not prefer to reduce much of their 
own current activity of those work tasks that dental hygienists are qualified to perform. 
 
The findings from this paper imply an inefficient use of dental professions with different 
levels of skills. Even if there is scope for greater efficiency resistance against alterations 
in the task division is found within the professions, especially among the dentists. There 
is good reason to assume that there is scope for efficiency gains from improved task 
division between other health professions as well, e.g between doctors and nurses. Policy 
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makers in health systems characterised by global budgets and cost-containment are aware 
of the need to employ available labor resources in the most cost-effective manner, and the 
struggle for achievements in this area will continue and probably be intensified in the 
future. However, demonstrating the scope for efficiency gains and a need for change is 
not enough; initiatives like this also require appropriate incentives to actually change the 
way professionals work. 
 
4.3 PAPER III 
WHAT A DIFFERENCE A PLACE MAKES:  
DENTAL ATTENDANCE AND SELF-RATED ORAL HEALTH  
AMONG ADULTS IN THREE COUNTIES IN NORWAY 
The study explores the relationships of dental attendance and self-rated oral health 
(SROH) to individual and structural factors among adults in Norway with different 
accessibility to dental services. The individual factors include various socio-demographic 
characteristics. The structural ones are population density (PD) and dentist density (DD). 
The survey sample was recruited from three counties representing three different 
combinations of PD and DD.  
 
There were significant differences in both dental attendance and SROH between the 
counties. The multilevel logistic regression analysis showed that the probability of not 
attending dental service on a regular basis was four times higher in the low PD/low DD 
county, than in the high PD/high DD county. The findings support the theory of a 
structural explanation of the observed differences and they indicate evidence of supplier-




The findings from this paper call for oral health improvement strategies in Norway 
reaching above the individual level. The results indicate unequal access to, and an 
unequal need for, dental services throughout the country. Attendance to dental services is 
typically studied at the individual level, with a view to ascertain perceived barriers to 
access. The dominant oral health preventive model, with its focus on individual risk 
factors, has evolved from the biomedical nature of dentistry. The multilevel analysis of 
this study allows the opportunity to explore the impact of structural factors on dental 
attendance and SROH as well. The paper suggests that peoples’ access to dental services 
can be improved either by regulating the supply aspect of dentistry (e.g. by limiting the 
number of dentists per capita in an area), or by compensating for travel costs incurred 
when accessing dental services.  
 
4.4 PAPER IV 
ON THE ABSENCE OF REGULATIONS OF ADULT DENTAL SERVICES  
IN NORWAY: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
The paper addresses the situation of free pricing and free establishment rights in 
Norwegian dentistry. Price regulation of dental services and establishment control of 
dental clinics was suggested by the committee appointed in 2004, to evalute the public 
involvement in oral health care. The arguments in favour of these regulations foreground 
patient benefits emphasising the potential in these measures for levelling out inequallities 




The public debate following the suggested regulations is analysed using a critical 
discourse analysis perspective. This analysis takes into account official documents 
involved in this particular policy debate, as well as the sociocultural context in which 
these texts are produced and consumed and the discourse practice level which guide this 
text production and consumption.  
 
The analysis shows that free-market logic as well as the professional status and autonomy 
arguments of the dentists came first when the Norwegian Government opposed the 
proposed establishment and pricing regulations, while the patient benefit arguments were 
lost in the process. The powerful positioning of the dentist in the Norwegian oral health 
care system is seen as an important explaining factor for the outcome of the debate. 
Another important factor explaining the outcome relates to the lack of explicit patient 
focus in the debate. This might be due to a poor knowledge base concerning access to 
dental services and the oral health status among adults in Norway, a situation which 
requiers more research. 
 
The critical discourse analytical approach used in this paper allows for an emphasis of 
structures and processes which systematically create and recreate ideologically-based 
power differences in the Norwegian oral health care system. Pointing out such power 
structures and identifying effective rhetorical strategies and persuasive arguments in the 
oral health care discourse is crucial, particularly as part of future discussions and 




5 FINAL REFLECTIONS 
 
“Normal dental care coverage by insurance seems to have suffered from its  
being the ideal and ultimate, but an end to reach in the future, not now.  
Somehow, however, the future has never been arrived at.” (Erichsen, 1990) 
 
The above quote was one of the conclusions drawn in Erichsen’s thesis – a case study 
conducted almost 20 years ago comparing dental care in Britain and Norway. The future 
has still not arrived in Norway, but the question is whether it is about to do so. As these 
lines are written, a new general election is nearing in Norway (September 2009), and the 
political parties are approaching this election with manifestos of oral health care reforms 
like never before. The Conservative Party is actually the only one making no such 
promises. Among the other parties, there seem to be unanimous political agreement that 
oral health care has to be included as part of the general health care system with universal 
public subsidy for dental service costs.  
 
The formulations included in the election program concerning oral health care reform 
decided by the Norwegian Labour Party Congress can be seen as the result of an internal 
grassroots revolt; this is a much more radical proposition than the one suggested by the 
program committee that was proposed from the floor and passed. The disputed decision 
concerns deductions of dental service costs for all adult patients; the patient pays below a 
ceiling and the third-party pays above. Other political parties (SV, Sp, KrF and Venstre) 




Another change compared to the situation twenty years ago is the presence of Facebook 
and other social electronic networks. In March 2009, a Facebook-group (Tannbehandling 
inn under folketrygdsystemet med egenandelskort og frikort) was established for the 
purpose of exercising political pressure for increased public subsidy of peoples dental 
service costs. After existing for only a month the group had already attracted 100,000 
members. Facebook initiatives such as this stand a chance of being brushed aside as non-
committal utterances. However, they have the potential to serve as an innovative mean to 
voice dental patients’ concerns in the oral health care discourse and alter the power 
balance in the oral health care system. 
 
Time will tell if the Norwegian oral health care system actually is changed. The proposed 
deduction arrangements will probably contribute to solve some of the access problems. 
However, more public funding opens for opportunistic behaviour from both professionals 
and the public and increased regulations and control will be required. Deduction 
arrangements will probably still not solve the geographical access problems. Changes 
will call for more research and evaluations to assess any improvements concerning 
provision and access to dental services. However, even if the system is not changed, it 
will still be interesting for further research. 
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